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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the barriers to the diffusion of development across countries over the very
long-run. We find that genetic distance, a measure associated with the amount of time elapsed since
two populations’ last common ancestors, bears a statistically and economically significant correlation
with pairwise income differences, even when controlling for various measures of geographical
isolation, and other cultural, climatic and historical difference measures.  These results hold not only
for contemporary income differences, but also for income differences measured since 1500 and for
income differences within Europe. We uncover similar patterns of coefficients for the proximate
determinants of income differences, particularly for differences in human capital and institutions.
The paper discusses the economic mechanisms that are consistent with these facts. We present a
framework in which differences in human characteristics transmitted across generations - including
culturally transmitted characteristics - can affect income differences by creating barriers to the
diffusion of innovations, even when they have no direct effect on productivity. The empirical














wacziarg@gsb.stanford.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
What explains the vast diﬀerences in income per capita that are observed across countries? Why
are these diﬀerences so persistent over time? In this paper, we argue that barriers to the diﬀusion of
development prevent poor countries from adopting economic practices, institutions and technologies
that make countries rich. We argue that these barriers are not only geographic, but also human.
We propose and test the hypothesis that cross-country diﬀerences in human characteristics that are
transmitted with variations from parents to children create barriers to the diﬀusion of development.
These vertically transmitted characteristics include cultural features, such as language and habits,
among other characteristics of human populations.
In recent years a large empirical literature has explored the determinants of income levels using
cross-country regressions, in which the level of development, measured by income per capita, is
r e g r e s s e do nas e to fe x p l a n a t o r yv a r i a b l e s . 1 In this paper, we depart from this usual methodology.
We are not primarily concerned with the factors that make countries rich or poor. Instead, we are
concerned with the barriers that prevent poor countries from adopting better income determinants,
whatever they are. To do so, we use income diﬀerences between pairs of countries as our depen-
dent variable, and various measures of distance as regressors. Our approach allows us to consider
measures of distance between countries across several dimensions, and to investigate whether those
distances play a role as barriers to the diﬀusion of development.2
For the ﬁrst time, we document and discuss the relationship between genetic distance and
diﬀerences in income per capita across countries. We use genetic distance between populations as
a measure of their degree of similarity in vertically transmitted characteristics (VTCs). Measures
1Recent contributions to this literature include Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001),
Easterly and Levine (2003), Alcalá and Ciccone (2004), Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004), Glaeser, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) among others.
2There is a voluminous literature on cross-country income convergence, dating back to Baumol (1986). In the
neoclassical literature, convergence occurs because the marginal return to capital is higher in countries farther from
their steady-state, which depends, among other things, on the level of technology (the "A" parameter). In contrast,
we seek to shed light on the factors that prevent or facilitate the diﬀusion of productivity-enhancing innovations
across countries. In this respect, our paper is closer to the approach in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), where
technological diﬀusion drives convergence. Policy-induced constraints on the diﬀusion of technology are analyzed by
Parente and Prescott (1994, 2002). Policy experimentation and imitation across neighbors are studied by Mukand
and Rodrik (2005). Unlike these contributions, we consider more broadly the barriers to the diﬀusion of technological
and institutional characteristics in the very long run.
1of genetic distance between populations are based on aggregated diﬀerences in allele frequencies
for various loci on a chromosome. In this paper we use measures of FST distance, also known
as coancestor coeﬃcients. FST distances, like most measures of genetic diversity, are based on
indices of heterozygosity, the probability that two genes at a given locus, selected at random from
the relevant populations, will be diﬀerent (heterozygous). Since most genetic diﬀerences tend to
accumulate at a regular pace over time, as in a kind of molecular clock, genetic distance is closely
linked to the time since two populations’ last common ancestors - that is, the time since two
populations were in fact the same population. Hence, genetic distance can be used to determine
paths of genealogical relatedness of diﬀerent populations over time (phylogenetic trees).3
The main ﬁndings of this paper are fourfold. First, measures of genetic distance between
populations bear a statistically and economically signiﬁcant eﬀect on diﬀerences in income per
capita, even when controlling for various measures of geographical isolation, and other cultural,
climatic and historical diﬀerence measures. Second, the eﬀe c to fg e n e t i cd i s t a n c eh o l d sn o to n l yf o r
contemporary income diﬀerences, but also for income diﬀerences measured since 1500. While the
eﬀect is always large, positive, and signiﬁcant, the magnitude of the eﬀect has varied over time in
an interesting way. The eﬀect declined from 1500 to 1820, went up dramatically, peaked at the time
of the Industrial Revolution, and steadily declined afterwards. Third, the eﬀect of genetic distance
on income diﬀerences is larger for countries that are geographically closer. Finally, the eﬀect of
genetic distance holds not only for contemporary and historical worldwide income diﬀerences, but
also for income diﬀerences within Europe. The magnitude of the eﬀect of genetic distance is larger
within European countries than across countries from all continents.
In a nutshell, the correlation between genetic distance and income diﬀerences is extremely robust
over time and space, but also presents important variations over those dimensions. These variations
over time and space provide valuable clues about the economic interpretation of the eﬀect.
What is the economic meaning of this eﬀect? One possibility is that this correlation may
just reﬂect the impact of variables aﬀecting both genetic distance and income diﬀerences. If that
were the case, controlling for those variables would eliminate the eﬀect of genetic distance on
3Our main source for genetic distances between human populations is Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi and Piazza (1994).
The classical reference on evolutionary rates at the molecular level is Kimura (1968). A recent textbook reference on
human population genetics is Jobling, Hurles and Tyler-Smith (2004). For a nontechnical discussion of these concepts
see Dawkins (2004).
2income diﬀerence. We control for a large number of reasonable suspects (geographical and climatic
diﬀerences, measures of geographical isolation, etc.). In particular, we control for geography and
region-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences that may impede the diﬀusion of development, as emphasized by Jared
Diamond in his inﬂuential book Guns, Germs and Steel (1997).4 We ﬁnd that these geographical
and regional variables often do have an eﬀect on income diﬀerences, but that their inclusion does
not eliminate the eﬀect of genetic distance as an independent explanatory variable. Moreover, the
eﬀect of genetic distance on income diﬀerences holds within Europe, where geographic diﬀerences
are much smaller.
Our empirical analysis opens the door to a causal interpretation of the relationship between ge-
netic distance and income diﬀerences. What mechanisms can explain a causal link? It is important
to stress that a link from genetic distance to income diﬀerences is not evidence that the mechanisms
themselves are genetic. On average populations that are more genetically distant have had more
time to diverge in a broad variety of characteristics transmitted intergenerationally. These include
characteristics that are passed on genetically, through DNA, but also some that are passed on
non-genetically, i.e. culturally.5 As long as these cultural characteristics are transmitted to younger
generations from genetically related individuals, they will be correlated with genetic distance. Lan-
guage is an obvious example. While humans are genetically predisposed to learn some language,
there is no gene for speaking Japanese or Italian. However, people who speak the same language
tend to be closely related genetically because most children learn their language from their parents.
Moreover, since languages (and other deep cultural characteristics) change gradually over time,
people who speak more similar languages also tend to be closer to each other genealogically.6
Therefore, one should not view genetic distance as an exclusive measure of distance in DNA-
transmitted characteristics. It is more appropriate to interpret genetic distance as a general metric
4See also Olsson and Hibbs (2005).
5By vertical cultural transmission we mean any transmission of characteristics from parents to children that does
not take place through DNA, such as language. Evolutionary models of cultural transmission have been developed,
by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985). For a nontechnical discussion see Cavalli-
Sforza and Cavalli-Sforza (1995, chapter 8). Economic models of cultural transmission from parents to children have
been provided by Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001). Galor and Moav (2003) present an innovative theory of long-term
economic growth in which a key role is played by evolutionary changes in preference parameters that are genetically
transmitted across generations. For an in-depth discussion of these issues, see also Galor (2005).
6See Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi and Piazza, 1994, pp. 96-105.
3for genealogical distance between populations, capturing overall average diﬀerences not only in
genetically transmitted features but also in culturally transmitted characteristics. In this paper we
will deﬁne vertically transmitted characteristics (VTCs) to be all characteristics passed on from
parents to children, whether through DNA or culturally. If we take this broader perspective, we can
interpret the eﬀect of genetic distance on income diﬀerences as evidence of an important role for
vertically-transmitted characteristics, reﬂecting divergent historical paths of diﬀerent populations
over the long run.7
Rather than addressing the "nature versus nurture" debate, which is beyond the scope of our
analysis, we interpret our ﬁndings as evidence for the economic importance of long-term divergence
in VTCs of diﬀerent populations: the diﬀusion of development is impeded by barriers arising from
diﬀerences in VTCs. That said, it is also true that we ﬁnd clues pointing to cultural transmission
rather than purely genetic transmission as a likely mechanism behind our results. For instance, as
we already mentioned, we ﬁnd large eﬀects of genetic distance on income diﬀerences within Europe.
That is, genetic distance explains income diﬀerences between populations that are geographically
close, have shared very similar environments, and have had a very short time to diverge genetically
(in many cases, less than a few thousand years). Since cultural change is much faster than genetic
change, and most genetic change, especially in the short-run, is neutral (i.e. unrelated to natural
selection), our ﬁndings are consistent with cultural transmission as a key mechanism explaining
persistent income diﬀerences.8
While we do not wish to push the distinction between genetic and cultural transmission too
far, we do stress a diﬀerent distinction. That is the distinction between a direct eﬀect and a
barrier eﬀect.V T C sh a v ead i r e c te ﬀect if they enter directly into the production function - say, by
improving total factor productivity. An example would be the transmission of a more productive
work ethic from parents to children. By contrast, a barrier eﬀect occurs if diﬀerent characteristics
between populations prevent or reduce the diﬀusion of productivity-enhancing innovations (more
productive technology, institutions, etc.). For example, diﬀerences in language may have no direct
7Moreover, as we brieﬂy discuss in Section 2.2, any sharp distinction between "genetic" and "cultural" charac-
teristics may be misleading, since the economic impact of genetic and cultural characteristics is likely to depend on
their combination and interaction.
8The view that cultural transmission trumps genetic transmission in explaining diﬀerences within human popu-
lations is standard among geneticists and anthropologists. For nontechnical discussions of these issues, see Diamond
(1992, 1997), Cavalli-Sforza and Cavalli-Sforza (1995), Olson (2002) and Richerson and Boyd (2004).
4bearing on productivity but may act as obstacles to the introduction of innovations arising from
populations with diﬀerent languages. Another way of stating this idea is to say that diﬀerences in
VTCs are obstacles to the horizontal diﬀusion of development.9 Hence, in principle, genetic distance
may explain income diﬀerences because of direct eﬀects (some populations have more productive
VTCs than others), barrier eﬀects (diﬀerent VTCs prevent the horizontal diﬀusion of innovations),
or both. It is worth noting that either eﬀect would be suﬃcient to account for the correlation we
document.10
Generally, a precise decomposition of the two eﬀects is conceptually and empirically diﬃcult, as
s o m eV T C sm a yh a v eb o t hd i r e c ta n db a r r i e re ﬀects. However, our data provide clear indications
that VTCs act at least in part as barriers to the diﬀusion of development. First, there exists a
negative interaction between genetic distance and geographical distance. That is, we ﬁnd that
genetic distance has a bigger eﬀect on income diﬀerences for country pairs that are geographically
close. This result is consistent with a simple model in which geographical and genetic distance are
both barriers to the diﬀusion of innovations. The intuition is straightforward: if genetic distance
acts as a barrier, it matters more for countries that are nearby, and face lower geographical barriers
to exchange with each other, while it is less important for countries that are far away, and would
learn little from each other anyway due to geographic distance.11 Second, there is a pattern in the
eﬀect of genetic distance on income diﬀerences over time, from 1500 to today: while the eﬀect of
genetic distance is always large, positive and signiﬁcant, it varies over time in an interesting way.
The eﬀect declined from 1500 to 1820, spiked up and peaked in 1870, and steadily declined again
afterwards. This is consistent with the interpretation of genetic distance as related to barriers
to the diﬀusion of innovations. The eﬀect of barriers should peak when a major innovation is
introduced and initially adopted only by the populations that are closest to the innovator (such as
the industrial revolution in the 19th century), but decline over time as the major innovation spreads
to more distant populations.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple analytical framework to help
9In the anthropology literature, vertical transmission takes place across (usually related) generations, while hori-
zontal transmission takes place across (possibly unrelated) groups of people belonging to the same generation.
10In fact, Section 2.1 presents a simple model in which barriers associated with diﬀerences in neutral VTCs are
suﬃcient to explain a positive eﬀect of genetic distance on income diﬀerences.
11By contrast, a simple model where VTCs and geographical characteristics directly aﬀect the production function
would not typically imply a negative interaction term.
5in the interpretation of our empirical work. Our simple model illustrates a) the link between genetic
distance and distance in VTCs, and b) the link between diﬀerences in VTCs and the diﬀusion of
innovations across populations. A key point is to show that random divergence in neutral VTCs
is suﬃcient to generate income diﬀerences if those VTCs are barriers to the horizontal diﬀusion of
innovations. An extension to non-neutral VTCs strengthens the link between genetic distance and
income diﬀerences. This section also presents and discusses a general taxonomy of the diﬀerent
channels through which genetic distance may aﬀect income diﬀerences. Section 3 discusses the
data and the empirical methodology used in this paper. Since we regress pairwise diﬀerences in
income on distance measures, we face a problem of spatial correlation, and address this estimation
issue using a new econometric methodology. Section 4 presents our empirical results: consistent
with our theoretical framework, we document that genetic distance is positively related to pairwise
diﬀerences in income per capita and in its proximate determinants. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
In the ﬁrst part of this section (Section 2.1) we propose a simple analytical framework to study
the diﬀusion of technological and institutional innovations across societies and its relationship with
genetic distance In the second part (Section 2.2) we provide a general discussion of the channels
through which genetic distance may aﬀect income diﬀerences, and brieﬂy discuss these channels in
relation to the existing literature.
2.1 VTCs, Genealogical Distance and the Horizontal Transmission of Innova-
tions
2.1.1 Setup
Our model starts from the following assumptions:
a) Innovations may be transmitted vertically (across generations within a given population) and
horizontally (across diﬀerent populations).
b) The horizontal diﬀusion of innovations is not instantaneous, but is a function of barriers to
technological and institutional diﬀusion.
c) Barriers to technological and institutional diﬀusion across societies are a function of how far
societies are from each other as a result of divergent historical paths.
6Productive knowledge is summarized by a positive real number Ait. We assume a linear tech-
nology Yit = AitLit,w h e r eLit is the size of the population, which implies that income per capita
is given by yit ≡ Yit/Lit = Ait.
For simplicity, we summarize all other relevant characteristics of a society (cultural habits
and traditions, language, etc.) as a point on the real line. That is, we will say that at each
time t a population i will have cultural characteristics qit, where qit is a real number.12 These
characteristics are transmitted across generations with variations.13 Over time, characteristics
change (vocabulary and grammar are modiﬁed, some cultural habits and norms are dropped while
new ones are introduced, etc.). Hence, at time t+1a population i will have diﬀerent characteristics,
given by:
qit+1 = qit + ηit+1 (1)
where qit are the characteristics inherited from the previous generations, while ηit+1 denotes cultural
change.
By the same token, the dynamics of productive knowledge includes vertical transmission across
generations as well as changes (innovations), that is:
Ait+1 = Ait + ∆it+1 (2)
where ∆it+1 denotes change in productivity due to technological and institutional innovations.
Changes may take place because of original discovery by agents that belong to population i and/or
because of successful imitation/adaptation of innovations that were discovered elsewhere. The
diﬀusion of technological and institutional innovations can be viewed as a special case of cultural
transmission.
We are interested in the long-run process of vertical and horizontal transmission of innovations
across populations at diﬀerent genealogical (i.e., genetic) distances from each other - that is, with
12Of course, this is a highly simpliﬁed and reductive way of capturing cultural diﬀerences. In general, culture is a
highly elusive and multi-faceted concept. In a well-known survey over ﬁfty years ago Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952)
listed 164 deﬁnitions of culture proposed by historians and social scientists. See also Boyd and Richerson (1985).
13A note on semantics is in order: while we call these characteristics "cultural" for illustrative purposes, qi could be
easily reinterpreted to include also genetically transmitted characteristics. The key points are that those characteris-
tics a) must be passed with variation from one generation to the next, and b) must aﬀect the probability of adopting
innovations from populations with diﬀerent characteristics.
7diﬀerent distances from their last common ancestor.14 To capture these relationships in the simplest
possible way, we will assume the following intergenerational structure. At time 0, there exists only
one population, with cultural characteristics q0 (normalized to zero) and productive knowledge
A0.15 At time 1 the population splits in two distinct populations (population 1 and population
2). At time 2, population 1 splits in two populations (populations 1.1 and 1.2), and population 2
splits in two populations (populations 2.1 and 2.2). This structure provides us with the minimum
number of splits we need to have variation in genealogical distances between populations at time
2. We can measure genetic distance between populations by the number of genealogical steps one
must take to reach the closest common ancestor population. Let d(i,j) denote the genetic distance
between populations i and j. Populations 1.1 and 1.2 have to go back only one step to ﬁnd their
common ancestor (population 1), while populations 1.1 and 2.1 have to go back two steps to ﬁnd
their common ancestor (population 0), as illustrated in Figure 1. Therefore, we have:
d(1.1,1.2) = d(2.1,2.2) = 1 (3)
and:
d(1.1,2.1) = d(1.1,2.2) = d(1.2,2.1) = d(1.2,2.2) = 2 (4)
What is the relationship between genealogical distance, cultural change and technological change?
In order to explore these issues, it is useful to consider the following benchmark assumptions:
A1. At each time t two populations i and j with Ait = Ajt face an identical probability πt of
discovering an original innovation that would increase productive knowledge by ∆t.
This assumption means that cultural characteristics qit per se do not have a direct eﬀect on the
rate of technological progress: two populations with diﬀerent cultural characteristics but identical
levels of productive knowledge face identical probabilities of expanding the technological frontier.
14By genealogical distance we mean the number of generations that separate two agents (in our case, populations)
from their last common ancestor. Two sisters are at a genealogical distance equal to one. Two ﬁrst cousins are at a
genealogical distance equal to two. Geneticists do not express genetic distances in terms of the number of generations
back to a common ancestor, but use measures of genetic similarity across populations that are closely correlated with
the number of genealogical steps. More details on the deﬁnition and construction of genetic distance measures are
provided in Section 3.
15In this analysis we will abstract from diﬀerences in size across populations, and assume that all populations have
identical size. For a discussion of the relationship between size and productivity, see Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg
(2005).
8Figure 1: Population Tree.
In other words, cultural characteristics are assumed to be neutral with respect to the process of
innovation.16
By contrast, it is reasonable to assume that the process of imitating somebody else’s innovation
is a function of the cultural distance between the innovator and the imitator. That is, we assume:
A2. If an innovation is introduced by some population i with cultural characteristics qi,t h e
extent to which a population j, with cultural characteristics qj, can increase its own technological
knowledge through the imitation and adaptation of population i’s innovation will depend on the
"cultural distance" between the two populations, that is, on |qj − qi|.
But how do diﬀerent populations end up with diﬀering cultural characteristics? For the purposes
of this analysis, we will consider a simple model of cultural divergence ("mimetic drift"):17
A3. Cultural transmission follows a random walk, in which cultural characteristics are trans-
mitted vertically across populations, while "cultural change" is white noise.
16We will relax this assumption below.
17If we reinterpret the variable qi as including some genetic characteristics, we can reinterpret the random process
as a case of "mimetic plus genetic drift". In this model we refer to qi a sap u r e l yc u l t u r a lv a r i a b l et os t r e s st h a t
VTCs include cultural features, not just genetic ones.
9Clearly, this is a highly stylized approximation of more complex phenomena, but it does provide
a simple way to capture the dynamics of changes in neutral cultural characteristics. Speciﬁcally,
we will assume that for each population i cultural characteristics are given by:
qi = qi0 + ηi (5)
where qi0 are the characteristics of the closest ancestor (population 0 for populations 1 and 2,
population 1 for populations 1.1 and 1.2, population 2 for populations 2.1 and 2.2), and ηi is equal
to η>0 with probability 1/2 and −η with probability 1/2.18
When cultural characteristics follow the above process, we can immediately show that on average
cultural distance between two populations is increasing in their genealogical distance. Speciﬁcally,
in our example, the expected cultural distance between populations at a genealogical distance
d(i,j)=1is:
E{|qj − qi||d(i,j)=1 } = η (6)
while populations at a genealogical distance d(i,j)=2have twice the expected cultural distance:
E{|qj − qi||d(i,j)=2 } =2 η (7)
The above relationships imply that, on average, populations that are closer genealogically will also
be closer culturally:
E{|qj − qi||d(i,j)=2 } − E{|qj − qi||d(i,j)=1 } = η>0 (8)
This is not a deterministic relationship: it is possible that two populations that are genealogically
distant will end up with more similar cultures than two populations which are more closely related.
But that outcome is less likely to be observed than the opposite. In summary, we have:
Result 1
On average, greater genealogical (i.e., genetic) distance is associated with greater cultural dis-
tance.
18W ea s s u m et h i sp r o c e s st ok e e pt h ea l g e b r aa ss i m p l ea sp o ssible, without loss of generality. The key assumption
is that ηi must be white noise.
102.1.2 Innovations and Diﬀusion with Neutral VTCs
We are now ready to study the relationship between diﬀusion of innovations, cultural change,and
genetic distance within our framework.
First of all, consider the case in which inter-population barriers to the horizontal diﬀusion
of innovations are prohibitive. In other terms, consider the case in which there is no horizontal
transmission of innovations, but just vertical transmission. To ﬁx ideas, suppose that at time
t =1 , each of the two existing populations (1 and 2) could independently increase its inherited
productivity A0 by ∆ > 0 with probability π. Assuming that no other innovation takes place at
time 2, what are the expected diﬀerences in income across populations at time 2?
Populations with the same closest ancestor will inherit the same productive knowledge (either
A0 or A0 + ∆) and will not diﬀer in income per capita. That is:
E{|yj − yi||d(i,j)=1 } =0 (9)
On the other hand, populations 1 and 2 will transfer diﬀerent technologies to their descendants if
and only if one of the two population has successfully innovated at time 1 while the other population
has not. This event takes place with probability 2π(1 − π). Hence, expected income diﬀerences
across populations with genealogical distance equal to 2 are given by:
E{|yj − yi||d(i,j)=2 } =2 π(1 − π)∆ (10)
Not surprisingly, when technological innovations diﬀuses only via vertical transmission, income
diﬀerences are strongly correlated with genealogical distance:
E{|yj − yi||d(i,j)=2 } − E{|yj − yi||d(i,j)=1 } =2 π(1 − π)∆ > 0 (11)
The relationship is stronger the higher is the variance of innovations across population (which, in
our example, is measured by π(1 − π)), and it is highest at π =1 /2.
By contrast, if there were no barriers to the horizontal transmission of innovations across
populations, all societies would have the same income per capita independently of their genealogical
distance.19 In general, genealogical distance matters for income diﬀerences if and only if there
are barriers to horizontal diﬀusion. Let us consider the case in which barriers are positive but
19For all populations at time 1 and 2, we would have y = A0+ ∆ with probability 1 − (1 − π)
2 and y = A0 with
probability (1 − π)
2.
11not prohibitive. That is, if population i innovates and increases its productivity to A+ ∆ while
population j does not innovate, population j will be able to increase its total factor productivity
to:
A +m a x {(1 − β|qj − qi|)∆,0} (12)
where β measures barriers to the diﬀusion of innovations across populations with diﬀerent VTCs
qi and qj.20 Now, populations 1 and 2 will not e n du pw i t ht h es a m et e c h n o l o g yi fa n do n l yi fa )
only one of the two populations ﬁnds the innovation (an event with probability 2π(1−π)), and b)
the two populations are culturally diﬀerent - that is, one experienced a cultural change equal to η
while the other experienced −η (an event with probability 1/2). If both a) and b) hold (an event
with probability π(1−π)), one of the two populations will have productivity equal to A0+∆ while
the other will have productivity equal to A0+(1−2βη)∆. If no additional diﬀusion can take place
at time 2 (that is, if horizontal transmission is possible only for contemporaneous innovations), we
have:
E{|yj − yi||d(i,j)=2 } − E{|yj − yi||d(i,j)=1 } =2 π(1 − π)βη∆ > 0 (13)
The above equation shows that income diﬀerences are increasing in genealogical distance if and
only if there are positive barriers to diﬀusion (β 6=0 ) and populations diverge culturally over time
(η 6=0 ).
In the above example we have assumed that horizontal diﬀusion of the innovation introduced
at time 1 takes place only contemporaneously - that is, at time 1. The analysis can be extended to
allow for further horizontal transmission at time 2.
C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ei nw h i c ha tt i m et two populations (say, 1.1 and 1.2) have "inherited" tech-
nology A0 + ∆ by vertical transmission while the other two populations (say, 2.1 and 2.2) have
inherited A0 +( 1− 2βη)∆. From population 2.1’s perspective, the unadopted innovation from
period 1 is:
[A0 + ∆] − [A0 +( 1− 2βη)∆]=2 βη∆ (14)
If we consider this situation as equivalent to the case in which populations 1.1 and 1.2 come up
with a new innovation of size 2βη∆, we can model the adoption of that innovation by population
2.1 as:
∆2.1 =[ 1− β|min{|q2.1 − q1.1|,|q2.1 − q1.2|}]2ηβ∆ (15)
20In the rest of the analysis, for simplicty and without loss of generality, we assume that β|qj − qi| < 1.
12where the expression min{|q2.1 −q1.1|,|q2.1 −q1.2|} captures the fact that population 2.1 will adopt
the innovation from the population that is culturally closer.
In this case, the expected income gap between populations at diﬀerent genealogical distance is
given by:
E{|yj − yi||d(i,j)=2 } − E{|yj − yi||d(i,j)=1 } = π(1 − π)β2η2∆ > 0 (16)
which, again, implies a positive correlation between diﬀerences in income per capita and genealogical
distance, as long as β 6=0and η 6=0 .21
We can summarize the above analysis as:
Result 2
Income diﬀerences across populations are increasing in genealogical (i.e., genetic) distance if
and only if there are positive barriers to the diﬀusion of innovations (β 6=0 ) and populations
diverge culturally over time ( η 6=0 ).
2.1.3 Non-Neutral VTCs
The above results have been obtained under the assumption that VTCs are neutral - that is, they
bear no direct eﬀect on the production function and on the process of innovation itself, but only
on the process of horizontal diﬀusion of innovations. The assumption can be relaxed by allowing a
direct eﬀect of cultural characteristics on the probability of innovating.22 Speciﬁcally, assume that
population i’s probability of ﬁnding an innovation is given by:
πi = π + φqi
This means that a higher qi is associated with more innovations and a lower qi with less innovations.
T h ea n a l y s i sa b o v ec a nb ev i e w e da st h es p e c i a lc a s eφ =0 . Under this more general assumption
equation (13) becomes:
E{|yj − yi||d(i,j)=2 } − E{|yj − yi||d(i,j)=1 } =2 [ π(1 − π)+φ2η2]βη∆ (17)
21An analogous equation can be obtained for innovations that occur in period 2. If the four populations inherit
identical technologies from period 2 and each population can ﬁnd an innovation of size ∆ in period 2 with probability
π we have E{|yj − yi||d(i,j)=2 } − E{|yj − yi||d(i,j)=1 } =2 π
2(1 − π)
2βη∆ > 0
22In the Appendix we will consider extensions in which cultural characteristics may directly aﬀect not only the
probability of innovating, but also the level of productivity once the innovation has been adopted.
13This equation shows that the larger the direct impact of cultural characteristics on the probability
of innovating, the stronger the relationship between expected income diﬀerences and genealogical
distance, provided there are barriers to diﬀusion (β 6=0 ) and cultural heterogeneity (η 6=0 ). In
other words, a direct eﬀect of cultural characteristics on the innovation process strengthens the
relationship between genealogical (i.e., genetic) distance and income gaps, as long as there are
barriers to the diﬀusion of innovations, consistent with Result 2 above.
2.2 VTCs and Income Diﬀerences: A General Taxonomy
In the analytical framework presented above, we have illustrated a simple mechanism of develop-
ment diﬀusion implying a positive correlation between genealogical distance (i.e. distance from the
last common ancestors) and income diﬀerences. The central feature of the framework is the link
between genealogical distance and the vertical transmission of characteristics across generations. In
our model, we showed how diﬀerences in neutral characteristics (that is, characteristics that do not
have a direct eﬀect on productivity and innovations) can explain income diﬀerences by acting as
barriers to the diﬀusion of innovation across populations. We then extended the model to include
possible direct eﬀects of VTCs on productivity. Speciﬁcally, in our framework we considered a direct
eﬀect of diﬀerent characteristics on the probability of adopting productivity-enhancing innovations.
We have seen how direct eﬀects increase the magnitude of the correlation between genetic distance
and income diﬀerences, but are not necessary for the existence of a positive correlation: barrier
eﬀects due to neutral VTCs are suﬃcient to explain a positive correlation between genealogical
distance and income diﬀerences.
In our framework we have referred to the transmission of characteristics as cultural - that is, not
directly related to the transmission of DNA from parents to children. We have done that for two
reasons. One reason is conceptual: to provide a model that clearly shows how a direct link from
DNA-transmitted characteristics to economic outcomes is not necessary for our results, as long as
the vertical transmission of cultural characteristics takes place among genetically-related individ-
uals (typically, parents and children). The second reason is substantial. Our focus is on income
diﬀerences across diﬀerent populations of Homo Sapiens Sapiens, taking place over a relatively
short period in terms of genetic evolution, and we expect that over that time frame divergence in
cultural characteristics have played an important role.
However, in principle the insights from our framework can be generalized to include a broader
14set of channels through which characteristics are vertically transmitted. In general, characteristics
can be transmitted across generations through DNA (genetic transmission, or GT - e.g. eye color)
or through pure cultural interactions (cultural transmission, or CT - e.g., a speciﬁc language).
Moreover, VTCs, whether transferred through GT or CT, may aﬀect income diﬀerences because
of a direct (D) eﬀects on productivity or because they constitute barriers (B) to the transmission
of innovations across populations. Hence, in general one can identify four possible combinations of
mechanisms through which VTCs may aﬀect income diﬀerences: a GT direct eﬀect, a GT barrier
eﬀect, a CT direct eﬀect, and a CT barrier eﬀect.23 The following chart summarizes the four
possibilities.
Direct Eﬀect (D) Barrier Eﬀect (B)
Genetic Transmission (GT) Quadrant I Quadrant II
Cultural Transmission (CT) Quadrant III Quadrant IV
Taxonomy of the eﬀects of VTCs
For instance, VTCs aﬀecting the trade-oﬀ between quality and quantity of children in the
theoretical framework proposed by Galor and Moav (2002) to explain the Industrial Revolution
would be examples of GT direct eﬀects (Quadrant I). GT barrier eﬀects (Quadrant II) could stem
from visible genetically-transmitted characteristics (say, physical appearance) that do not aﬀect
productivity directly, but introduce barriers to the diﬀusion of innovations and technology by
reducing exchanges and learning across populations that perceive each other as diﬀerent.24 Direct
eﬀects of cultural characteristics have been emphasized in a vast sociological literature that goes
back at least to Max Weber.25 A recent empirical study of the relationship between cultural
values and economic outcomes that is consistent with the mechanisms of Quadrant III is provided
by Tabellini (2004). The link between cultural characteristics and barriers (Quadrant IV) is at
23It is important to notice that these conceptual types should not be viewed as completely separable, but rather as
points on a logical continuum, which may involve a mix of them. For a recent general discussion of the interactions
between biological and cultural transmission, see Richerson and Boyd (2004). Recent results in genetics that are
consistent with complex gene-culture interactions are provided by Wang et al. (2006).
24This eﬀect is related to recent work by Guiso, Sapienzan and Zingales (2004), who argue that diﬀerences in
physical characteristics may aﬀect the extent of trust across populations. Visible diﬀerences across ethnic groups also
play an important role in the analysis of ethnic conﬂict by Caselli and Coleman (2002).
25More recent references can be found in the edited volume by Harrison and Huntington (2000).
15the core of our basic model, while our extension to non-neutral cultural characteristics may be
interpreted as an example from Quadrant III.
It is worth pointing out that the distinction between GT and CT may be useful to ﬁx ideas, but
is not a clear-cut dichotomy. In fact, this distinction, essentially that between nature and nurture,
may be misleading from an economic perspective, as well as from a biological perspective. Generally,
the economic eﬀects of human characteristics are likely to result from interactions of cultural and
genetic factors, with the eﬀects of genetic characteristics on economic outcomes changing over
space and time depending on cultural characteristics, and vice versa. To illustrate this point,
consider diﬀerences across individuals within a given population (say, the U.S.). Consider a clearly
genetic characteristic of an individual, for instance having two X chromosomes. This purely genetic
characteristic is likely to have had very diﬀerent eﬀects on a person’s income and other economic
outcomes in the year 1900 and in the year 2000, because of changes in culturally transmitted
characteristics over the century. This is a case where the impact of genes on outcomes varies with
a change in cultural characteristics.26 By the same token, one can think of the diﬀerential impact
of a given cultural characteristic (say, the habit of drinking alcohol) on individuals with diﬀerent
genetic characteristics (say, genetic variation in alcohol dehydrogenase, the alcohol-metabolizing
enzyme). An example of a complex interactions in which culture aﬀects genes is the spread of the
gene for lactose tolerance in populations that domesticated cows and goats. In the interpretation
of our empirical analysis we will not dwell much on the distinction between genetic and cultural
transmission of characteristics, but interpret genetic distance as an overall measure of diﬀerences
in the whole set of VTCs.
On the other hand, we will have more to say empirically on whether our estimates capture a
direct versus a barrier eﬀect of VTCs. Our model so far has ignored the role of geographic barriers
in the diﬀusion of development. In Appendix 1, we present a variety of reduced form models,
extending our basic framework to include geographic barriers. We focus on the interaction term
between geographic barriers and barriers linked to diﬀerences in VTCs. We show that a negative
eﬀect of this interaction term on income diﬀerences arises naturally from models in which VTCs
act as barriers. The basic intuition is simple and general: under the barriers interpretation, if
populations are far apart geographically, then it should matter less that they are also distant along
26This is a variation on an example by Alison Gopnik in her comment to the now-famous Pinker vs
Spelke debate at http://www.edge.org/discourse/science-gender.html#ag. Pinker’s response is also available at
http://www.edge.org/discourse/science-gender.html.
16some other dimension for the ﬂow if development-enhancing innovations. In contrast, models where
VTCs bear direct eﬀects on income do not predict such a negative interaction term, as it is the
presence or absence of traits that determines directly the extent of the income gain, irrespective of
geographic distance. We will use these theoretical insights in our empirical work to test whether
diﬀerences in VTCs act at least partly as barriers to the diﬀusion of development.
3 Data and Empirical Methodology
3.1 Data
Genetic Distance Since the data on genetic distance that we use as a measure of distance
in vertically-transmitted characteristics is not commonly used in the economics literature, it is
worth spending some time describing it.27 Genetic distance measures the genetic similarity of
two populations. The basic unit of analysis is the allele, or the variant taken by a gene. By
sampling populations for speciﬁc genes, geneticists have compiled data on allele frequencies, i.e.
the proportion of the population with a gene of a speciﬁcv a r i a n t . 28 Diﬀerences in allele frequencies
are the basis for computing summary measures of distance based on aggregated diﬀerences in allele
frequencies across various genes (or loci on a chromosome). Following Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994),
we will use measures of FST distance, also known as coancestor coeﬃcients (Reynolds et al., 1983).
FST distances, like most measures of genetic diversity, are based on indices of heterozygosity, the
probability that two genes at a given locus, selected at random from the relevant populations,
will be diﬀerent. The construction of FST distances can be illustrated for the simple case of two
populations (a and b) of equal size, one locus, and two alleles (1 and 2). Let pa and qa be the
gene frequency of allele 1 and allele 2, respectively, in population a.29 The probability that two
randomly selected genes at a given locus are identical within the population ("homozygosity") is
27As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst study of the relationship between genetic distance and diﬀerences in income
per capita across countries. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), in a parallel study, use genetic distance between
European populations as an instrument for a measure of trust in order to explain bilateral trade ﬂows. This is quite
diﬀerent from our application, as we are interested in explaining income diﬀerences, not trade ﬂows. Their results
are consistent with our interpretation of genetic distance as related to barriers. An economic application of measures
of genetic distance across diﬀerent species is provided by Weitzman (1992).
28Allele frequencies for various genes and for most populations in the world can be conveniently searched online at
http://alfred.med.yale.edu/





a +2 paqa =1 .
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a + q2
a, and the probability that they are diﬀerent ("heterozygosity") is:
ha =1− p2
a + q2
a =2 paqa (18)
By the same token, heterozygosity in population b is:
hb =1− p2
b + q2
b =2 pbqb (19)
where pb and qb be the gene frequency of allele 1 and allele 2, respectively, in population b.T h e










Heterozygosity in the sum of the two populations is:
h =1− p2 + q2 =2 pq (22)













If the two populations have identical allele frequencies (pa = pb), FST is zero. On the other hand,
if the two populations are completely diﬀerent at the given locus (pa =1and pb =0 , or pa =0and
pb =1 ),FST takes value 1. In general, the highest the variation in the allele frequencies across
the two populations, the higher is their FST distance. The formula can be extended to account for
L alleles, S populations, diﬀerent population sizes, and to adjust for sampling bias. The details of
these generalizations are provided in Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994, pp. 26-27).30
T h e s em e a s u r e so fg e n e t i cd i s t a n c eh a v eb e e nd e v ised mainly to reconstruct phylogenies (or
family trees) of human populations. FST (which is also known as the coancestor coeﬃcient) can
be interpreted as the distance to the most recent common ancestors of two populations. Thus, in
30For a general discussion of measures of genetic distances, see also Nei (1987).
18eﬀect, genetic distance is related to how long two populations have been isolated from each other.31
If two populations split apart as the result of outmigration, their genes start to change as a result
of genetic drift (randomness) and natural selection. When calculating genetic distances in order to
study population history and phylogenesis, geneticists concentrate on neutral characteristics that
are not aﬀected by strong directional selection occurring only in some populations and environments
(Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1994, p. 36).32 In other words, the term "neutral markers" refers to genes
aﬀected only by drift, not natural selection.
If the populations are separated, this process of change will take them in diﬀerent directions,
raising the genetic distance between them. The longer the period for which the separation lasts,
the greater will genetic distance become. More speciﬁcally, the rate of evolution is the amount of
evolutionary change, measured as genetic distance between an ancestor and a descendant, divided
b yt h et i m ei nw h i c hi to c c u r r e d . I fd r i f tr a t e sa re constant, genetic distance can be used as a
molecular clock - that is, the time elapsed since the separation of two populations can be measured
by the genetic distance between them. Figure 2, from Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994), illustrates the
process through which diﬀerent human populations have split apart over time. Heuristically, genetic
distance between two populations is captured by the horizontal distance separating them from the
next common node in the tree.
In this paper we will use FST distance as a measure of "genealogical distance" between popula-
tions. Consistent with our theoretical framework, we expect a larger FST distance to reﬂect a longer
separation between populations, and hence, on average, a larger diﬀerence in VTCs. The data itself
is from Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994), p. 75-76: we focus on the set of 42 world populations for which
they report all bilateral distances, based on 120 alleles.33 These populations are aggregated from
31Isolation here refers to the bulk of the genetic heritage of a given population. Small amounts of interbreeding
between members of diﬀerent populations do not change the big picture.
32The classic reference for the neutral theory of molecular evolution is Kimura (1968). For more details on the
neutral theory, the molecular clock hypothesis, and the construction and interpretation of measures of genetic distance,
a recent reference is Jobling et al. (2004). The fact that genetic distance is calculated with respect to neutral genetic
markets implies that genetic distance can provide an especially useful measure for the channels of Quadrants III and
IV in Figure 2 (Section 2.3).
33Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) also provide a diﬀerent measure of genetic distance (Nei’s distance). Nei’s distance,
like FST,m e a s u r e sd i ﬀerences in allele frequencies across a set of speciﬁc genes between two populations. FST and
Nei’s distance have slightly diﬀerent theoretical properties, but the diﬀerences are unimportant in practice as they
are very highly correlated, and the choice of measures does not impact our results (as we show below).
19Figure 2: Genetic distance among 42 populations. Source: Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1994.
20subpopulations characterized by a high level of genetic similarity. However, measures of bilateral
distance among these subpopulations are available only regionally, not for the world as a whole.34
Among the set of 42 world populations, the greatest genetic distance observed is between Mbuti
Pygmies and Papua New-Guineans, where the FST distance is 0.4573, and the smallest is between
the Danish and the English, for which the genetic distance is 0.0021.35 The mean genetic distance
among the 861 available pairs is 0.1338.
Genetic distance data is available at the population level, not at the country level. It was thus
necessary to match populations to countries. We did so using ethnic composition data from Alesina
et al. (2003). In many cases, it was possible to match ethnic group labels with population labels
from Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994). The was supplemented with information from Encyclopedia
Britannica when the mapping of populations to countries was not achievable from ethnic group
data. Obviously, many countries feature several ethnic groups. We matched populations to the
dominant ethnic group, i.e. the one with the largest share of the country’s population.36 Random
error in the matching of populations to countries should lead us to understate the correlation
between genetic distance and income diﬀerences, and we further discuss the issue of measurement
error stemming from possible mismatches below.
The ethnic composition in Alesina et al. (2003) refers to the 1990s. This is potentially en-
dogenous with respect to current income diﬀerences if the latter are persistent and if areas with
high income potential tended to attract European immigration since 1500. This would be the case
for example under the view that the Europeans settled in North America because of a favorable
geographical environment.37 In order to construct genetic distance between countries as of 1500
34In our empirical work, we make use of the more detailed data for Europe in order to extend our results.
35Among the more disaggregated data for Europe which we also gathered, the smallest genetic distance (equal
to 0.0009) is between the Dutch and the Danish, and the largest (equal to 0.0667) is between the Lapp and the
Sardinians. The mean genetic distance across European populations is 0.013. As can be seen, genetic distances are
roughly ten times smaller on average across populations of Europe than in the World dataset. However, we still ﬁnd
that they signiﬁcantly predict intra-Europe income diﬀerences.
36We have also computed measures of weighted genetic distance by using the data on each ethnic group within
a country. The measure reﬂects the expected distance between two randomly selected individuals, one from each
country in a pair. Weighted genetic distances are very highly correlated with unweighted ones, so as we show below
f o rp r a c t i c a lp u r p o s e si td o e sn o tm a k eab i gd i ﬀerence which one we use.
37In fact, income diﬀerences are not very persistent at a long time horizon such as this - see Acemoglu et al. (2002).
Our own data shows that pairwise log income diﬀerences in 1500 are uncorrelated with the 1995 series in the common
21(in an eﬀort to obtain a variable that is more exogenous than current genetic distance), we also
mapped populations to countries using their ethnic composition as of 1500, i.e. prior to the major
colonizations of modern times. Thus, for instance, while the United States is classiﬁed as predom-
inantly populated with English people for the current match, it is classiﬁed as being populated
with North Amerindians for the 1500 match. This distinction aﬀected mostly countries that were
colonized by Europeans since 1500 to the point where the main ethnic group is now of European
descent (New Zealand, Australia, North America and some countries in Latin America). Genetic
distance in 1500 can be used as a convenient instrument for current genetic distance. The matching
of countries to populations for 1500 is also more straightforward, possibly reducing measurement
error.
Geographic Distance. In addition to genetic distance, we also used several measures of geo-
graphic distance. The ﬁrst is a measure of the greater circle (geodesic) distance between the major
cities of the countries in our sample. This comes from a new dataset compiled by researchers at
CEPII.38 This dataset features various measures of distance (between major cities, between capi-
tals, weighted using several distances between several major cities, etc.), all of which bear pairwise
correlations that exceed 99%. The dataset includes other useful controls such as whether pairs of
countries share the same primary or oﬃcial language, whether the countries are contiguous, whether
they had a common colonizer, etc. We used some of these controls in our regressions.
The second measure of geographic distance that we use is latitudinal distance - i.e. simply
the absolute value of the diﬀerence in latitude between the two countries in each pair: GLA
ij =
|latitudei − latitudej|. Latitude could be associated with climactic factors that aﬀect income levels
directly, as in Gallup, Mellinger and Sachs (1998) and Sachs (2001). Latitude diﬀerences would also
act as barriers to technological diﬀusion: Diamond (1997) suggests that barriers to the transmission
of technology are greater along the latitude direction than along the longitude direction, because
similar longitudes share the same climate, availability of domesticable animal species, soil condi-
tions, etc. We should therefore expect countries at similar latitudes to also display similar levels of






to capture geographic isolation along this alternative axis.
sample (Table 1).
38The data is available free of charge at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
22Summary Statistics Table 1, Panel A displays correlations between our various measures of
distance.39 Perhaps surprisingly, these correlations are not as high as we might have expected. For
instance, the correlation between geodesic distance and FST genetic distance is only 35.4% - though
unsurprisingly it rises to 47.8% if genetic distance is measured based on populations as they were
in 1500 (the colonization era acted to weaken the link between genetic distance and geographic
distance by shuﬄing populations across the globe). The correlation between alternative measures
of genetic distance, on the other hand, tends to be quite high: the FST measure and the Nei measure
of genetic distance bear a correlation of 92.9%, so it should not matter very much which one we use.
Finally, our various measures of genetic distance bear positive correlations between 14% and 22%
with the absolute value of log income diﬀerences in 1995.40 Together, these correlations suggest it




Since our empirical methodology is new, we describe it in some detail. We depart from the usual
approach, which consists of regressing income levels or income growth on a set of determinants.
Instead, we consider a speciﬁcation in which the absolute diﬀerence in income between pairs of
countries (or other dependent variables such as measures of institutions and human capital) is re-
gressed on measures of distance between the countries in this pair. We computed income diﬀerences
between all pairs of countries in our sample for which income data was available, i.e. 13,861 pairs
of countries. Thus our baseline speciﬁcation is:





5Xij + εij (25)
where GD
ij is genetic distance, GG
ij is geodesic distance, GLA
ij is latitudinal distance, GLO
ij is longi-
tudinal distance, Xij is a set of controls capturing other types of barriers and εij is a disturbance
39Panel B presents means and standard deviations of the main variables, allowing us to assess the quantitative
magnitudes of the eﬀects estimated in the regressions that follow.
40The data on per capita income is purchasing power-parity adjusted data from the World Bank, for the year 1995.
We also used data from the Penn World Tables version 6.1 (Summers, Heston and Aten, 2002), which made little
diﬀe r e n c ei nt h er e s u l t s . W ef o c u so nt h eW o r l dB a n kd a t af o r1 9 9 5a st h i sa l l o w su st om a x i m i z et h en u m b e ro f
countries in our sample.
23term to be further discussed below.41
The reason our empirical speciﬁcation must involve income diﬀerences rather than a single
country’s income level on the left hand side is that this makes the use of bilateral measures of
barriers possible. There is no other way to quantify the impact of barriers, which are inherently
of a bilateral nature, on income diﬀerences. Conceptually, therefore, we depart in a major way
from existing methodologies: our regression is not directional, in the sense that the right-hand side
variable takes on the same value for each country in the pair, i.e. our speciﬁcation is not simply
obtained by diﬀerencing levels regressions across pairs of countries.42
We should stress that equation (25) is a reduced form. That is, diﬀerences in income are
presumably the result of diﬀerences in institutions, technologies, human capital, savings rates, etc.,
all of which are possibly endogenous with respect to income diﬀerences. Whether income diﬀerences
are caused by these factors is the subject of a vast literature but is not primarily the subject of this
paper. This paper is concerned with barriers to the diﬀusion of these more proximate causes of
income diﬀerences: barriers work to explain diﬀerences in income presumably because they aﬀect
the adoption of technologies, norms for human and physical capital accumulation, the adoption
of institutions conducive to diﬀerential economic performance, etc.. In Section 5 we will relate
barriers to diﬀerences in human capital, institutions, investment rates, population growth rates
and openness. Evaluating the role of genetic distance in aﬀecting income diﬀerences through these
various channels, however, does not form the core of our argument.
3.2.2 Estimation
We estimate equation (25) using a new methodology. In principle, if one is willing to assume
that the measures of barriers are exogenous, equation (25) can be estimated using least squares.
However, in this case usual methods of inference will be problematic. Consider three countries,
1, 2 and 3. Observations on the dependent variable |logy1 − logy2| and |logy1 − logy3| will be
correlated by virtue of the presence of country 1 in both observations. Conditioning on the right-
hand side variables (which are bilateral in nature) should reduce cross-sectional dependence in the
41We also estimated an alternative speciﬁcation where the distance measures were all entered in logs. This did not
lead to appreciable diﬀerences in the economic magnitude or statistical signiﬁcance of any of the estimates.
42This, obviously, would result in adding no new information relative to the levels regressions themselves. Our
methodology is more akin to gravity regressions in the empirical trade literature than to levels or growth regressions
in the literature on comparative development.
24errors ε12 and ε13, but we are unwilling to assume that observations on the dependent variable are
independent conditional on the regressors.43 In other words, simple least squares standard errors
will lead to misleading inferences due to spatial correlation.
Before proceeding, we note the following observations and conventions: with N countries, there
are N(N−1)/2 distinct pairs. Denote the observation on absolute value income diﬀerences between
country i and country j as dyij. Pairs are ordered so that country 1 appears in position i and is
m a t c h e dw i t ha l lc o u n t r i e sf r o m2...N appearing in position j. Then country 2 is in position i and
is matched with 3...N appearing in position j, and so on. The last observation has country N − 1
in position i and country N in position j. We denote the non-zero oﬀ-diagonal elements of the
residual covariance matrix by σm where m is the country common to each pair.
A simple example when the number of countries is N =4is illustrative. In this case, under our
maintained assumption that the error covariances among pairs containing a common country m
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In this context, controlling for a common-country ﬁxed eﬀect should account for the correlated part
of the error term. For this we rely on well-known results cited in Case (1991), showing that ﬁxed
eﬀects soak up spatial correlation, though in a context quite diﬀerent from ours: we do not have
longitudinal data, and the panel nature of our dataset comes from the fact that each country is
43Another feature that reduces the dependence across pairs is the fact that the dependent variable involves the
absolute value of log income diﬀerences. Simple simulations show that under i.i.d. Normal income draws with moments
equal to those observed in our sample (Table 1b), the correlation between absolute value diﬀerences in income for
any two pair containing the same country will be about 0.22. Without taking absolute values, it is straightforward
to notice that the correlation would be exactly 0.5.




γkδk + νij (26)
where δk =1if k = i or k = j, δk =0otherwise, and νij is a well-behaved disturbance term.
We treat δk as ﬁxed eﬀects, i.e. we introduce in the regression a set of N dummy variables δk
each taking on a value of one N −1 times.45 Given our estimator, the eﬀect of the right-hand side
variables is identiﬁed oﬀ the variation within each country, across the countries with which it is
matched.
It is in principle possible to test for the presence of spatial correlation both in the model with
common country ﬁxed eﬀect and without. Such tests, known as Moran’s I-tests, require specifying a
neighborhood matrix along which non-zero correlations are allowed. In our case, the neighborhood
matrix is easy to conceptualize: its entries are 1 whenever there is a common country in a pair, zero
otherwise. Unfortunately, the dimensionality of the neighborhood matrix the square of the number
of observations. In the case of our worldwide dataset, there would be 192,127,321 entries, making
the problem computationally intractable. We have run I-tests for our smaller dataset of European
countries, where the matrix has 87,616 entries.46 Without dummies, Moran’s I test suggested the
presence of spatial correlation. With common country dummies added to the speciﬁcation, it did
not. We ﬁnd this to be encouraging.
To summarize, for each country we create a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country appears
in a given pair. We then include the full set of N dummy variables in the regression. The in-
clusion of these ﬁxed eﬀects soaks up the spatial correlation in the error term resulting from the
presence of each country multiple times in various country pairs. In addition, our standard errors
44Note that simply treating εi and εj as ﬁxed eﬀects, by including corresponding dummy variables in the regression,
will not fully address our concern. This is because, with the exception of country 1 and country N, all countries will
appear either in position i or in position j in diﬀerent observations, inducing spatial correlation between these pairs.
In the example above, for instance, country 2 appears in position i in observation 1, and in position j in observation
4, inducing spatial dependence between ε12 and ε23.S i m p l ec o u n t r yﬁxed eﬀects would not soak up this dependence.
45The inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects did not greatly alter the signs or magnitudes of the estimates of the slope coeﬃcients
on our variables of interest, compared to simple OLS estimation. In contrast, in line with our expectations, our
common-country ﬁxed eﬀects technique resulted in standard errors that were quite diﬀerent from (and generally
much larger than) the (wrong) ones obtained with simple OLS.
46The speciﬁcation being tested is the baseline speciﬁcation of Column 6 in Table 6. Details of these tests are
available upon request.
26are heteroskedasticity-consistent (i.e. we correct standard errors to account for the fact that the
diagonal elements of Ω might diﬀer).47
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Baseline Results
The baseline estimates of equation (25) are presented in Table 2. Columns (1) through (5) feature
our measures of distance entered one by one. The results are in line with expectations: greater
distance, whether genetic, latitudinal, longitudinal or geodesic, is signiﬁcantly associated with
greater income diﬀerences. Univariate results using FST genetic distance (column 4) suggest that
a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance is associated with a 0.198 increase in log
income diﬀerences - 21.77% of this variable’s standard deviation.48 Columns (5) and (6) shows
that it matters little whether we use Nei genetic distance rather than FST genetic distance. In fact,
the impact of a standard deviation diﬀerence in Nei genetic distance is slightly larger than that of
FST distance. We will focus on FST genetic distance for the remainder of this paper, since as we
discussed it has a clear interpretation as genealogical distance.
Column (6) and (7) enters all three measures of distance together, for the Nei and FST distance
measures respectively. Interesting results emerge. First, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on geodesic
distance falls by over one third, suggesting that it was capturing at least in part the eﬀect of genetic
distance. Second, the coeﬃcient on latitudinal distance also becomes smaller in magnitude. Hence,
including genetic distance greatly reduces the eﬀect of geographic barriers. Once controlling for
47There are obviously several ways to address the issue of spatial correlation in our context. An alternative we
considered would be to do feasible GLS by explicitly estimating the elements of Ω, and introducing the estimated Ω as a
weighing matrix in the second stage of the GLS procedure. While apparently straightforward, this is computationally
demanding as the dimensionality of Ω is large - in our application we have over 13,000 country pairs with available
data on the variables of interest, and up to 167 covariance terms to estimate - so we leave this for future research.
We also pursued several bootstrapping strategies based on selecting subsamples such that the problem of spatial
correlation would not occur, generating results very similar to those we present here. Details and results from these
bootstraps are available upon request. In contrast to these alternatives, our approach is computationally easy to
implement.
48This percentage is the commonly used standardized beta coeﬃcient, which we will use throughout as a convenient
measure of the economic magnitudes of our estimates. The standardized beta coeﬃcient is reported in the last line
of each table.
27genetic distance, the eﬀect of a one standard deviation change in latitudinal distance on income
diﬀerences is almost halved, with a standardized beta of 6.64%: the income diﬀerences observed
unconditionally across latitudes (column 2) are not primarily geographical, but linked to diﬀerences
in vertically transmitted characteristics captured by genetic distance. Finally, longitudinal distance
bears a coeﬃcient that is now negative and economically small.
Column (8) introduces a set of control variables that might proxy for diﬀerent sets of barriers,
linguistic, historical and geographic (the Xij variables in equation (25)). Some of these variables,
such as the one reﬂecting linguistic similarity and colonial history, are perhaps less exogenous with
respect to income diﬀerences than the distance measures already considered, so results should be
interpreted cautiously. Several lessons emerge. First, the signs of the coeﬃcients are largely as
expected. Contiguous countries tend to have more similar income levels, as do countries that were
ever a single political entity. Countries that have had a common colonizer share more similar income
levels, though the eﬀect is small in magnitude. Unsurprisingly, income diﬀerences are greater when
countries were ever in a colonizer-colonized relationship. On the other hand, having substantial
fractions of the populations in each country speaking the same language bears a very small eﬀect
on income proximity, and the sign is the opposite of that expected (we will return to the issue
of linguistic distance below). Second, these coeﬃcients are estimated quite precisely. Third, and
perhaps most importantly, the inclusion of these controls does not modify the estimates on our
main variables of interest: the distance measures, in particular genetic distance, hardly change at
all. Across speciﬁcations, variation in genetic distance accounts for about 20% of the variation in
income diﬀerences.
Together, these results provide evidence consistent with the model of cultural barriers intro-
duced in Section 2: genetic distance enters with a positive, statistically signiﬁcant and economically
meaningful coeﬃcient in all speciﬁcations. Moreover, we ﬁnd some weak empirical support for the
idea that income diﬀerences are less pronounced along similar latitudes than across latitudes, once
we control for genetic distance.
4.2 Extensions and Robustness
We now consider a number of extensions and robustness tests on the baseline speciﬁcation in column
(8) of Table 3. We enter additional controls, make use of alternative genetic distance data, and
examine competing or complementary hypotheses on the diﬀusion of development.
28The Interaction between Genetic and Geographic Distances. In column (1) of Table 3,
we assess whether the eﬀects of genetic distance might depend on geodesic distance, by adding the
interaction between the two variables to the baseline speciﬁcation. We ﬁnd strong evidence of a
negative interaction eﬀect: genetic distance matters less for income diﬀerences when countries are
far apart geographically, and the eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant. As discussed in Section 2.2 and
Appendix 1, we can interpret this result as evidence in favor of the barrier interpretation for genetic
distance: the eﬀect of genetic distance falls as physical distance increases, so these two types of
b a r r i e r sa c ta tl e a s ti np a r ta ss u b s t i t u t e sf o re a c hother. There would be no reason to observe this
pattern of coeﬃcients if genetic distance mattered only as the result of a genetic trait bearing a
direct eﬀect on income levels. The magnitude of the overall eﬀect of genetic distance, evaluated at
the mean of geodesic distance, is very close to the magnitudes estimated in the baseline speciﬁcation
(with a standardized beta coeﬃcient of 17.96% versus 18.23%).
Weighted Genetic Distance. As we described above, in our baseline results we used data
on genetic distance between the plurality populations of each country. Some countries, such as
the United States or Australia, are made up of sub-populations that are distinct, and for which
genetic distance data is available in the worldwide data on genetic distances between 42 populations
(for example Australia is composed of Aboriginals and populations of English descent). To improve
upon the measurement of genetic distance between countries, we made use of a measure of weighted
genetic distance. The measure is computed as follows: Assume that country 1 contains populations
i =1 ...I and country 2 contains populations j =1 ...J,d e n o t eb ys1i the share of population i in
country 1 (similarly for country 2)a n ddij the genetic distance between populations i and j.T h e






s1i × s2j × dij (27)
The interpretation of this measure is straightforward: it represents the expected genetic distance
between two randomly selected individuals, one from each country. Since there are few countries
composed of more than one populations for which there is data available in the worldwide dataset of
42 populations, and since variation induced by the plurality groups tend to dominate by construc-
tion, the correlation between weighted genetic distance and the genetic distance measure based on
plurality matching is very high - 93.4%. Unsurprisingly, therefore, in column (2) of Table 3 the
magnitude of the eﬀect of WFST is only slightly larger than in our baseline speciﬁcation, possibly
29reﬂecting a lesser incidence of measurement error using weighted distance. In what follows we
continue to focus on the measure based on plurality match.
Possible Endogeneity of Genetic Distance. Next, we attempt to control for the possible
endogeneity of genetic distance with respect to income diﬀerences. While diﬀerences in (neutral)
allele frequencies between the populations of two countries obviously do not result causally from
income diﬀerences, migration could lead to a pattern of genetic distances today that is closely linked
to current income diﬀerences. Consider for instance the pattern of colonization of the New World
starting after 1500. Europeans tended to settle in larger numbers in the temperate climates of North
America and Oceania. If geographic factors bear a direct eﬀect on income levels, and geographic
factors were not properly accounted for in the regressions through included control variables, then
genetic distance today could be positively related to income distance not because cultural distance
precluded the diﬀusion of development, but because similar populations settled in regions prone to
generating similar incomes.
To assess this possibility, column (3) of Table 3 excludes from the sample any pairs involving
one or more countries from the New World (deﬁned as countries in North America, Latin America,
the Caribbean and Oceania), where the problem identiﬁed above is likely to be most acute. The
eﬀect of genetic distance is now actually marginally larger than in column (8) of Table 2. The
diﬀerence in latitudes becomes three times larger, an observation to which we shall return below.
Next, we use our data on FST genetic distance as of 1500 as an instrument for current genetic
distance in column (4) of Table 3. This variable reﬂects genetic distance between populations as
they were before the great migrations of the modern era, and yet is highly correlated (65.8%)w i t h
current genetic distance, so it fulﬁlls the conditions of a valid instrument. Again, the magnitude
of the genetic distance eﬀe c ti sr a i s e d-i nf a c ti ti sm o r et h a ndoubled in magnitude when 15th
century genetic distance is used as an instrument for current genetic distance: a standard deviation
change in genetic distance now accounts for 39.26% of a standard deviation in absolute log income
diﬀerences. As is usual in this type of application, the larger estimated eﬀect may come from a
lower incidence of measurement error under IV - the matching of populations to countries is much
more straightforward for the 1500 match. The results suggest that, if anything, our baseline results
were understating the eﬀect of genetic distance on income diﬀerences.
30The Diamond Gap. Jared Diamond’s (1997) inﬂuential book stressed that diﬀerences in latitude
played an important role as barriers to the transfer of technological innovations in early human
history, and later in the pre-industrial era, an eﬀect that could have persisted to this day. Our
estimates of the eﬀect of latitudinal distance provided some evidence that this eﬀect was still at
play: in our regressions we have found evidence that diﬀerences in latitudes help explain some of
t h ei n c o m ed i ﬀerences across countries, and this eﬀect was much larger when excluding the New
World from our sample. However, Diamond took his argument one step further, and argued that
Eurasia enjoyed major advantages in the development of agriculture and animal domestication
because a) it had the largest number of potentially domesticable plants and animals, and b) had a
predominantly East-West axis that allowed an easier and faster diﬀusion of domesticated species. By
contrast, diﬀerences in latitudes in the Americas and Africa created major environmental barriers
to the diﬀusion of species and innovations. More generally, Eurasia might have enjoyed additional
beneﬁts in the production and transfer of technological and institutional innovations because of its
large size.49
To test and control for a Eurasian eﬀect, we constructed a dummy variable that takes on
a value of 1 if one and only one of the countries in each pair is in Eurasia, and 0 otherwise
(the "Diamond gap").50 In order to test Diamond’s hypothesis, we added the Diamond gap to
regressions explaining income diﬀerences in 1995 (column 5) and in 1500 (column 6). For the
former regression, we restrict our sample to the Old World. It is appropriate to exclude the New
World from the sample when using 1995 incomes because Diamond’s theory is about the geographic
advantages that allowed Eurasians to settle and dominate the New World. If we were to include
the New World in a regression explaining income diﬀerences today, we would include the higher
income per capita of non-aboriginal populations who are there because of guns, germs and steel,
i.e. thanks to their ancestors’ Eurasian advantage. As expected, in the regression for 1995 income
diﬀerences, the Diamond gap enters with a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, and its inclusion
reduces (but does come close to eliminating) the eﬀect of genetic distance. In column (6), using
1500 income diﬀerences as a dependent variable, the Diamond gap is again signiﬁcant and large in
magnitude, despite the paucity of observations. This provides suggestive quantitative evidence in
favor of Diamond’s observation that the diﬀusion of development was faster in Eurasia. We also
49This point is stressed in Kremer (1993). See also Masters and McMillan (2001).
50For further tests providing statistical support for Diamond’s observations, see Olsson and Hibbs (2005).
31conclude that genetic distance between populations plays an important role in explaining income
diﬀerences even when controlling for the environmental advantages and disadvantages associated
with Eurasia, so Diamond’s hypothesis on the long-term diﬀusion of development is complementary
to ours.
Climatic Factors. Our remaining robustness tests are concerned with attempts to better control
for geographic factors. Since genetic distance is correlated with geographic distance, if we do not
suitably control for geographic factors we might wrongly attribute to diﬀerences in VTCs part of the
income diﬀerence that is really due to geography. We start by controlling explicitly for diﬀerences
in climate between countries. Latitudinal diﬀerence may partly but not perfectly capture these
climatic diﬀerences. We include as an additional control (column 7) a measure of climatic similarity
based on 12 Koeppen-Geiger climate zones.51 Our measure is the average absolute value diﬀerence,
between two countries, in the percentage of land area in each of the 12 climate zones. Countries
have identical climates, under this measure, if they have identical shares of their land areas in the
same climates. As a simpler alternative, we control for the absolute diﬀerence in the percentage
of land areas in tropical climates, also based on Koeppen-Geiger zones (column 8). In both cases,
we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of genetic distance is raised slightly in magnitude. As expected, climatic
diﬀerences bear a positive relationship with income diﬀerences, and, also as expected, the inclusion
of the climatic diﬀerence variable reduces the magnitude of the eﬀect of latitudinal diﬀerences.
Isolation controls. If our various measures of distance and geographic contiguity do not ade-
quately capture the extent to which countries may be geographically isolated from each other, we
may wrongly attribute to genetic distance the eﬀect of geographic isolation. To address this possi-
bility, we tried a variety of measures of geographic isolation in addition to those already included as
controls in our baseline speciﬁcation. In Table 4, column (1), we added a dummy variable taking on
a value of 1 if either country in each pair is an island, and a dummy similarly deﬁned for landlocked
countries. Both, as expected, bear large and positive coeﬃcients, consistent with the idea that
pairs where at least one country is an island or lan d l o c k e dw i l lb em o r ei s o l a t e df r o me a c ho t h e r ,
51The 12 Koeppen-Geiger climate zones are: tropical rainforest climate (Af), monsoon variety of Af (Am), tropical
savannah climate (Aw), steppe climate (BS), desert climate(BW), mild humid climate with no dry season (Cf), mild
humid climate with a dry summer (Cs), mild humid climate with a dry winter (Cw), snowy-forest climate with a dry
winter (Dw), snowy-forest climate with a moist winter (Ds), tundra/polar ice climate (E) and highland climate (H).
The data, compiled by Gallup, Mellinger and Sachs, is available at http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/eidata/.
32resulting on average in greater income diﬀerences. However, the inclusion of these variables does
not aﬀect the coeﬃcient on our variable of interest, genetic distance.
Continent Eﬀects. The largest genetic distances observed in our worldwide dataset occur be-
tween populations that live on diﬀerent continents. One concern is that genetic distance may simply
be picking up the eﬀect of cross-continental barriers to the diﬀusion of development, i.e. continent
eﬀects. If this were the case, it would still leave open the question of how to interpret econom-
ically these continent eﬀects, but to test explicitly for this possibility, we added to our baseline
speciﬁcation a dummy that takes on a value of 1 if the two countries in a pair are on the same
continent (column 2 of Table 4) and a similarly deﬁned set of dummies for six speciﬁcc o n t i n e n t s
(column 3). The results are as expected - with the exception of Asia and Oceania, living on the
same continent implies more similar income levels. The inclusion of continent dummies reduces
but does not eliminate the eﬀect of genetic distance, which remains statistically signiﬁcant. We
will provide further evidence on the within-continent eﬀects of genetic distance using our European
dataset.
Cultural distance. As we have emphasized, cultural factors such as language, religion, norms
and values are all part of the set of VTCs captured by genetic distance. In principle, genetic
distance will reﬂect diﬀerences in the whole set of VTCs. Are there speciﬁc cultural traits that
genetic distance may capture, and that could be directly measurable? How much of the estimated
eﬀect of genetic distance is attributable to diﬀerences in speciﬁc measurable VTCs? Columns (4)
through (6) of Table 4 include measures of linguistic distance and religious diﬀerences in an attempt
to answer this question.52
We use data on linguistic trees from Fearon (2003). Linguistic trees graphically display the
degree of relatedness of world languages. By counting the nodes separating language pairs in
linguistic trees, it is possible to construct discrete measures of distance between languages: in
Fearon’s data up to 15 nodes may separate languages (our variables are re-scaled from 0 to 1,
with 1 indicating high linguistic distance). Using data on the linguistic composition of countries,
and matching languages to countries, we can then construct indices of linguistic distance between
52In our baseline speciﬁcation we already included a measure of linguistic overlap - a dummy equal to 1 if at least
9% of the population in each country speaks the same language. This is a very crude measure of linguistic similarity,
a n dh e r ew es e e kt oi m p r o v eu p o ni t .
33countries. We did so, as for genetic distance, in two ways: ﬁrst, we computed a measure of
distance between plurality languages for each country pair. Second, we computed a measure of
weighted linguistic distance, representing the expected linguistic distance between two randomly
chosen individuals, one from each country in a pair (the formula is the same as that of equation 27).
This should improve the measurement of linguistic distance for countries where diﬀerent languages
as spoken by diﬀerent subpopulations. In columns (4) and (5) of Table 4, we include these two
measures of linguistic distance in turn. The eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant and of the expected
sign, but they are small in magnitude: the standardized beta on linguistic distance is equal to
3.62% in column (4) and to 5.15% in column (5). Hence, our measures of linguistic distance can
only account for a small fraction of the variation in income diﬀerences. Moreover, their inclusion
does not aﬀect the coeﬃcient on genetic distance.53
Next, in column (6) we included an index of religious diﬀerence. The index is the average ab-
solute value diﬀerence between the countries in a pair in the population shares of 11 major world
religions, obtained from Barrett (2001).54 Again, the variable takes on the expected positive sign.
Its standardized beta is again small, at 7.66%. Moreover, its inclusion barely aﬀects the coeﬃ-
cient on genetic distance compared to a regression obtained using the same sample (the estimated
coeﬃcient falls from 2.077 to 2.032).
These results have several interpretations. The most straightforward interpretation is that
diﬀerences in VTCs captured by genetic distance are not primarily linguistic and religious in nature.
This opens up the question of what they are, an important question for future research. Another
interpretation is that the speciﬁcm e a s u r e so fl i n g u i s t i ca n dr e l i g i o u sd i s t a n c et h a tw eu s ea r e
inadequate. Consider linguistic distance. We use a discrete measure based on counting common
nodes from a linguistic tree. It is a well-known fact that linguistic trees and genetic trees are very
similar, as demonstrated in Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994, p. 98-105). The reason is straightforward:
genes, like languages, are transmitted intergenerationally, and this insight is the basis for our
interpretation of genetic distance as capturing the full set of VTCs, both genetic and cultural. Yet
53The coeﬃcient on genetic distance is raised compared to column (8) of Table 2, but this is due to the slightly
smaller sample of available country pairs when we include linguistic distance, not to the inclusion of the latter variable.
The coeﬃcient on genetic distance is actually slightly smaller when we control for linguistic distance when the samples
a r ek e p tt h es a m e .T h i si sw h a tw ew o u l de x p e c ti fg e n e t i cd i s t a n c ec a p t u r e di np a r tt h ee ﬀect of linguistic distance.
54These religions are Roman Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox Christians, Other Christians, Muslims, Hindus,
Buddhists, Other East Asian Religions, Jews, Other Religions, Non-Religious Population.
34the correlation between our measure of genetic distance and linguistic distance is only about 25%.
This may be partly due to the fact that genetic distance is a continuous measure of distance, whereas
the number of nodes is a discrete measure of linguistic distance: populations may share few common
nodes but linguistic splits occurred recently, in which case one is overestimating distance, or they
may share lots of common nodes but the last split occurred a long time ago, in which case one is
underestimating distance. Better measures of linguistic distance based on lexicostatistical methods
are not widely available outside of Indo-European groups (see Dyen, Kruskal and Black, 1992).
Similarly, our measure of religious diﬀerence does not take into account the distance separating
diﬀerent religions but only the similarity in religious group shares. For instance, Protestants may
be "closer" to Catholics than to Buddhists, a feature that is not be captured by our measure.
Whatever the interpretation, our results show that genetic distance is an overall measure of
diﬀerences in VTCs that is robustly correlated with income diﬀerences, and we were not able to
identify speciﬁc measures of cultural distance that could alter this conclusion.
4.3 Alternative Time Periods and Samples
Historical Income Data. Table 5 examines whether the pattern of coeﬃcients uncovered for
income diﬀerences in 1995 held for earlier periods in history. We used income per capita data since
1500 from Maddison (2003), and repeated our basic reduced form regression for 1500, 1700, 1820,
1870, 1913 and 1960.55 For the 1500 and 1700 regressions, we use the early match for genetic
distance, i.e. genetic distance between populations as they were in 1492, prior to the discovery of
the Americas and the great migrations of modern times.56 For the subsequent periods we use the
current match. Table 5 shows that across periods, the coeﬃcient on genetic distance is statistically
signiﬁcant and positive. Moreover, the magnitudes are much larger than for the current period:
considering regressions obtained from a common sample of 26 countries (275 pairs) for which data is
55The data on income for 1960 is from the Penn World Tables version 6.1. For comparison, column (7) reproduces
the results for 1995.
56Regressions for these early periods feature at most 29 countries. These countries are Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, United States. There were 275 pairs (26 countries) with available data for 1500 income, and 328 pairs (29
countries) for 1700. A noteworthy feature of this sample is that it contains no countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
35Figure 3: Time Path of the Eﬀect of Genetic Distance, 1500-1995.
continuously available, standardized beta coeﬃcients range from 34.94% (1960) to 88.75% (1870).57
Thus, genetic distance is strongly positively correlated with income diﬀerences throughout modern
history. It is worth noting that genetic distance bears a large, positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
income diﬀerences for the past ﬁve centuries, even though income diﬀerences in 1500 and in 1995
are basically uncorrelated (the correlation between income diﬀerences in 1500 and in 1995 is −0.051
for the 325 country pairs for which data is available). This fact is consistent with our interpretation
of genetic distance as a barrier to the diﬀusion of innovations across populations.
Strong evidence for our model of barriers to diﬀusion can be obtained from plotting the time path
of coeﬃcients, as is done in Figure 3. The result is striking. The slope coeﬃcient of genetic distance
decreases gradually from 1500 to 1820, then spikes up in 1870 during the Industrial Revolution and
declines thereafter. This is fully consistent with our model where a major innovation (the Industrial
Revolution) initially results in large income discrepancies. These discrepancies persist in proportion
to genealogical relatedness. As more and more countries adopt the major innovation, the impact
of genetic distance progressively declines.
Overall, the historical permanence of the eﬀect of genetic distance on income disparities over the
57Similar orders of magnitudes are obtained from unrestricted samples though magnitudes were generally lower.
36past ﬁve centuries and the speciﬁct i m ep a t ho ft h ee ﬀect in relation to the timing of the Industrial
Revolution paint an empirical picture that is very consistent with the model of Section 2.
Genetic Distance across European Countries. Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) provide data on
genetic distances within certain regions of the world, in particular Europe. These data are more
disaggregated (i.e. cover more distinct populations) than the matrix of distances for 42 worldwide
populations. For Europe, they present a distance matrix for 26 populations that can be matched
readily to 25 European countries.58 Analyzing these data can be informative for several reasons.
First, it constitutes a robustness check on the worldwide results. Second, matching populations to
countries is much more straightforward for Europe than for the rest of the world, because the choice
of sampled European populations happens to match nation state boundaries. This should reduce
the incidence of measurement error. Third, genetic distances are orders of magnitude smaller across
countries of Europe, and genetic speciﬁcities within Europe have developed over the last couple of
thousand years (and not tens of thousands of years). It is very unlikely that any genetic traits have
risen to prominence within Europe as the result of strong natural selection over such a short period
of time, so a ﬁnding that genetic distance based on neutral markers within Europe is associated
with income diﬀerences would be evidence in favor of the cultural interpretation rather than a
genetic eﬀect.
Table 6 presents the results. Much to our surprise, genetic distance is again positively and
signiﬁcantly associated with income diﬀerences. Moreover, while genetic distance across European
countries are smaller than in the World sample, so are the income diﬀerences to be explained. Thus,
we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of FST distance is large in magnitude. The baseline estimate in column (6) of
Table 5, which includes several controls (we now exclude the colonial variables for obvious reasons)
suggests that a one standard deviation change in the log of genetic distance accounts for 49.18% of
the variation in log income diﬀerences. Thus, cultural barriers captured by genetic distance seem
very strongly associated with income diﬀerences. Physical distance measures correspondingly bear
small or insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients, suggesting that geographic barriers are not a big hindrance to
the diﬀusion of income across countries of Europe. The last column of Table 6 shows that genetic
distance accounts for an even greater amount (79.59%)o ft h ev a r i a t i o ni ni n c o m ed i ﬀerences in
58These countries are Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Macedonia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
371870, during the Industrial Revolution. Again, we take these diﬀerences in estimated magnitudes
as consistent with the barrier interpretation.
4.4 Eﬀects on the Proximate Determinants of Income Levels
Our approach to quantifying the barriers to the diﬀusion of development has been of a resolutely
reduced-form nature. That is, we did not specify what economic factors make incomes similar or
diﬀerent, and have instead focused on the eﬀects of geographic and cultural barriers on income
diﬀerences directly. However, diﬀerences in income result from more proximate causes. Several
prime candidates have been oﬀered to explain diﬀerences in income per capita. These factors are
summarized in the model of Section 2 by parameter A, and we now discuss them in greater detail.
In the tradition of the Solow model, steady-state income per capita is positively aﬀected by rates
of factor accumulation (in physical and human capital), and negatively aﬀected by the depreciation
of capital per worker, which is more rapid when population growth is faster. The level of total factor
productivity, in growth accounting or income accounting exercises, has been found to account for
much of the variation in growth and income levels.59 What causes diﬀerences in the levels of total
factor productivity, however, is largely unknown. On a general level, TFP is "technology", though
the deeper determinants of the adoption of better technologies are generally left unspeciﬁed. A
recent literature has stressed the importance of institutions as a determinant of productivity (the
seminal contribution here is Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001), and Glaeser et al. (2004)
have recently reemphasized the importance of human capital accumulation, rather than institutions,
as a central determinant of income levels. Finally, a large literature emphasized the role of market
size and openness as a driver of growth and income levels. We consider these ﬁve proximate causes
of income levels and examine the eﬀects of our measures of distance on pairwise diﬀerences in the
rate of physical capital accumulation, the rate of population growth, institutional quality, the stock
of human capital and openness. These are meant to reﬂect the prime candidate explanations for
59For an excellent survey on this point, see Caselli (2005).
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⇒ Income Diﬀerences
Our paper is primarily concerned with the ﬁrst arrow in this diagram, and there are voluminous
literatures and unresolved debates on the respective roles of the proximate determinants of income.
Thus, we do not attempt to decompose income diﬀerences into diﬀerences into the underlying
proximate cause, a task that is both a tall order and beyond the scope of this paper. We focus
instead on investigating empirically the role of our distance measures as determinants of diﬀerences
in the proximate determinants of income.
Institutions. Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) sug-
gest that the prime cause of economic development is the quality of a country’s institutions as the
outcome of a long-term historical process. If this is the case, countries that are distant in terms of
institutional quality should also be distant in terms of income per capita. We use a commonly-used
measure of institutional quality, the risk of expropriation variable (this variable, which ranges from
0 to 10, was used for instance in Acemoglu et al., 2001). Calculating the absolute value of the
pairwise diﬀerence in the risk of expropriation for 1990, we regressed this variable on our various
measures of geographic and cultural distance. Table 7, column (1) presents the results. The main
measures of distance are signiﬁcant when entered individually, but the log of geodesic distance be-
comes small in magnitude when genetic distance and latitudinal distance are entered alongside it.60
This is interesting, as latitudinal distance had a small eﬀect in the income diﬀerences regression.
Our ﬁnding that latitudinal distance matters for institutional diﬀerences is consistent with the
view that geographic and climatic factors have historically constituted hindrances to the diﬀusion
of institutions conducive to higher incomes. Our estimates suggest that a one standard deviation
change in genetic distance accounts for 17.99% of the variation in the diﬀerence in expropriation
risk.
60Results for the speciﬁcations where distance measures are entered individually are available upon request.
39Human Capital. In a recent paper taking issue with the literature on the primacy of institutions,
Glaeser et al. (2004) suggest that variation in human capital is the fundamental cause of income
diﬀerences across countries. To examine the role of geographic and cultural barriers in preventing
countries from adopting high levels of human capital, we reran the speciﬁcation of equation (25),
replacing the left hand side variable with the absolute diﬀerence in the stock of human capital,
measured by the average number of years of primary, secondary and tertiary schooling in the
population aged 25 and above in 1990.61 The results are presented in Table 7, column 2. The
pattern of coeﬃcients is similar to that obtained for institutions. A one standard deviation change
in genetic distance accounts for 23.01% of a standard deviationi nh u m a nc a p i t a ld i ﬀerences.
Population Growth. In column (3) of Table 7, we examine the determinants of absolute dif-
ferences in rates of population growth. In neoclassical growth models, rapid population growth
reduces the steady-state level of income per worker. Thus, diﬀerences in population growth (in
turn resulting mainly from diﬀerences in mortality and fertility) are thought to be associated with
diﬀerences in income. Again, measures of cultural and geographic distance may aﬀect how diﬀer-
ently countries’ populations grow.62 We particularly expect geographic distance measures to be
correlated with diﬀerences in population growth, as countries located closer to the equator tend
to have higher rates of population growth. Indeed, Table 7, column (3) shows that latitudinal
distance is positively related to population growth diﬀerences (where population growth is deﬁned
over the 1960-1990 period): the standardized beta for latitudinal distance is equal to 15%. Genetic
distance again appears to be signiﬁcantly related to the dependent variable, with a standardized
beta of 12.88%. One interpretation of this ﬁnding is that diﬀerences in VTCs are associated with
persistent diﬀerences in norms of behavior aﬀecting population growth, particularly fertility which
dominates the cross-country variation in population growth rates.63
Physical Capital Investment. The rate of investment in physical capital is also a determinant
of steady-state income levels in the neoclassical model. How do the geographic and cultural barriers
61The human capital data is from Barro and Lee (2000). Again, this is a commonly used, if imperfect, measure of
the stock of human capital.
62For a theoretical analysis of the relationships among VTCs, fertility and economic growth in the long run see
Galor and Moav (2002).
63A regression relating diﬀerences in fertility rates to our distance measures reveals a very signiﬁcant and large
eﬀect of genetic distance on fertility diﬀerences. These results are available upon request.
40to the diﬀusion of development relate to diﬀerences in this proximate cause of income levels? Table
7, column (4) provides the corresponding estimates, using the Penn World Tables version 6.1 series
on the investment share of GDP for 1990. The dependent variable is the absolute diﬀerence in
these shares across country pairs. Distance measures bear positive signs when they are entered
separately as well as jointly. Genetic distance is positively related to diﬀerences in investment
rates, and its magnitude is economically signiﬁcant (the standardized beta is equal to 12.52%). We
can interpret this ﬁnding as indicating that diﬀerences in VTCs hinder the adoption of norms of
investment behavior that are possibly conducive to superior economic outcomes.
Extent of the Market. Finally, there exists a very large literature on the causal links between
international openness, the extent of the market, and economic development. Recent contributions
that have emphasized the extent of the market as an important determinant of economic perfor-
mance include Ades and Glaeser (1999), Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000, 2005), Spolaore
and Wacziarg (2005). We examined whether diﬀerences in market size are related to our various
measures of distance. Our measure of market size is the conventionally used ratio of imports plus
exports to GDP (in 1990), which proxies for access to world markets. Table 7, column (5) displays
the results when using absolute diﬀerences in this openness variable as the dependent variable.
Diﬀerences in openness seem unrelated to most of the variables included in our model, with the
exception of the post-war common colonizer variable (this could capture an Africa eﬀect) and the
common language variable. Genetic distance appears unrelated to diﬀerences in trade openness.
To summarize, genetic distance is signiﬁcantly positively associated with diﬀerences in four of
the ﬁve proximate determinants of development that we considered, and these eﬀects are generally
large in magnitude. This conﬁrms the results found using income diﬀerences directly, and provides
suggestive evidence that genetic distance may act through several channels.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have documented the following facts: First, diﬀerences in income per capita
across countries are positively correlated with measures of genetic distance between populations.
Second, genetic distance, an overall measure of diﬀerences in vertically transmitted characteristics
across populations, bears an eﬀect on income diﬀerences even when a large set of geographical and
other variables are controlled for. Third, the patterns of relationships between income diﬀerences
41and measures of genetic and geographical distances hold not only for current worldwide data but
also for estimates of income per capita and genetic distance since 1500, as well as in a sample of
European countries. Finally, similar patterns hold when the dependent variable is diﬀerences in
human capital, institutional quality, population growth and investment rates.
These results strongly suggest that characteristics transmitted from parents to children over long
historical spans play a key role in the process of development. In particular, the results are consistent
with the view that the diﬀusion of technology, institutions and norms of behavior conducive to
higher incomes, is aﬀected by diﬀerences in vertically transmitted characteristics associated with
genealogical relatedness: populations that are genetically far apart are more likely to diﬀer in those
characteristics, and thus less likely to adopt each other’s innovations over time. The pattern of the
eﬀects of genetic distance in space and time, and the interaction with geographical distance, suggest
that genetic distance is associated with important barriers to the diﬀusion of development Some
evidence, particularly the results for European countries, also suggests that these diﬀerences may
stem in substantial part from cultural (rather than purely genetic) transmission of characteristics
across generations.
A ﬁnal consideration is about policy implications. A common concern with research document-
ing the importance of variables like genetic distance or geography is pessimism about its policy
implications. What use is it to know that genetic distance explains income diﬀerences, if one can-
not change genetic distance, at least in the short-run? These concerns miss a bigger point: available
policy variables may have a major impact not on genetic distance itself, but on the coeﬃcient that
measure the eﬀect of genetic distance on income diﬀerences. That coeﬃcient has been changing
over time, and can change further. If we are correct in interpreting our results as evidence for long-
term barriers across diﬀerent populations and cultures, signiﬁcant reductions in income disparities
could be obtained by encouraging policies that reduce those barriers, including eﬀorts to translate
and adapt technological and institutional innovations into diﬀerent cultures and traditions, and
to foster cross-cultural exchanges. More work is needed - at the micro as well as macro level - in
order to understand the speciﬁc mechanisms, market forces, and policies that could facilitate the
diﬀusion of development across countries with distinct long-term histories and cultures.
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46Appendix
In this Appendix we provide some simple models in which both geographical distance and
distance in vertically transmitted characteristics (genetic distance) aﬀect income diﬀerences by
aﬀecting barriers to the diﬀusion of innovations. We will show that a negative interaction between
geographical distance and genetic distance arises naturally in those models. First we will present a
simple reduced-form speciﬁcation, in which we compare barrier eﬀects and direct eﬀects stemming
from diﬀerences in geographical and VTCs. We will show that a negative interaction is consistent
with barrier eﬀects, while it is not implied by direct eﬀects. We will then sketch two speciﬁcm o d e l s
of barriers, with more explicit microeconomic interpretations, and show that those models do in
fact imply a negative interaction between geographical and genetic distance. The overall message
of this Appendix is that a negative interaction between geographical distance and genetic distance
is a robust implication of models in which both distances aﬀect income diﬀerences through their
eﬀects on barriers to the diﬀusion of productivity-enhancing innovations.
Reduced-form Setup
Consider a reduced-form barrier model in which the probability that country i adopts country
j’s innovation is:
P(f,g)=P1(f)P2(g)
where f is genetic distance between i and j and g is geographical distance between i and j.
Either distance reduces the probability of adoption - i.e., it constitutes a barrier to the diﬀusion of





P(f,g)=1− bff − bgg + bfbgfg
That is, the probability of adopting the same innovation is decreasing in f and g but increasing
in the interaction f × g. Hence, the expected income diﬀerence, which is inversely related to the
probability of adopting the same innovation, will be increasing in f and g, but decreasing in the
interaction f × g, as in our regressions.
47By contrast, suppose that vertically transmitted characteristics q’s had a direct eﬀect on total
factor productivity, with qi >q j:
TFAi = Ai = ai(qi)γ
Consistently with our framework in Section 2, assume that the diﬀerence in vertically transmitted
characteristics is a function of genetic distance. In particular, for analytical convenience and without
any loss of generality, assume:
lnqi − lnqj = Ψf
Suppose that society i comes up with an innovation that increases total factor productivity to some
level ai >a j If country j does not adopt the innovation, the diﬀerence in their levels of total factor
productivity is given by:
lnAi − lnAj =l nai − lnaj + γ(lnqi − lnqj)=Φ + γΨf
While if both countries adopt the innovation and achieve the same level of total factor productivity,
we have:
lnAi − lnAj = γ(lnqi − lnqj)=γΨf
By putting the two eﬀects together (barriers eﬀects to the adoption of the innovation, and direct
eﬀects from vertically transmitted characteristics), we have that the expected diﬀerence in total
factor productivities between countries i and j is:
lnAi − lnAj =( 1− P)Φ(ai − aj)+γΨf =[ bff + bgg − bfbgfg]Φ + γΨf = c1f + c2g + c3fg
where:
c1 = bfΦ + γΨ > 0
c2 = bgΦ > 0
c3 = −bfbgΦ < 0
This very simple reduced-form model implies a positive eﬀect of genetic distance and geographical
distance on income diﬀerences, and a negative interaction as long as both distances constitute
barriers to the diﬀusion of innovations (bf > 0 and bg > 0). It is also worth stressing that a direct
eﬀect of genetic distance on productivity diﬀerences (γΨ > 0) increases the magnitude of c1, but
it is not necessary for c1 > 0. In other terms, barrier eﬀects alone are suﬃcient for c1 > 0 and
c2 > 0,w h i l et h e ya r enecessary and suﬃcient for c3 < 0.
48Two Models of Barriers
In what follows we will brieﬂy sketch two models with a more explicit microeconomic interpre-
tation of the mechanisms through which barriers aﬀect the adoption of innovations. Model 1 will
focus on a physical interpretation of barriers: barriers may prevent societies from observing other
societies’s innovations Model 1 considers a cost interpretation of barriers: barriers increase the
costs to adapt and imitate other societies’ innovations. In either case, the model implies a negative
interaction between geographical distance and genetic distance.
Model 1
Consider a model in which both geographical distance and genetic distance reduce the proba-
bility that a society would be able to observe another society’s innovation.
Again, consider two countries (i and j), which are separated by N geographical steps and M
cultural steps. An innovation discovered in country i must travel all N plus M steps in order to
reach country j. At each cultural step there is a probability θf that the innovation will be "lost in
translation," while at each geographical step there is a probability θg that the innovation will fail
to make it through that geographical space, where 0 <θ f < 1 and 0 <θ g < 1.64 Therefore the two
countries’ expected diﬀerence in productivity and income per capita will be a function of the total
probability that the innovation is lost,i . e . :
P(N,M)=1− (1 − θf)M(1 − θg)N
It is immediately apparent that this probability is a positive function of the geographical distance




= −ln(1 − θf)(1 − θf)M(1 − θg)N > 0
∂P(N,M)
∂N
= −ln(1 − θg)(1 − θf)M(1 − θg)N > 0
∂2P(N,M)
∂M∂N
= −ln(1 − θf)ln(1− θg)(1 − θf)M(1 − θg)N < 0
Hence, these results are consistent with our reduced-form model above: diﬀerences in expected pro-
ductivity and income per capita are positively associated to measures of geographical and cultural
64Hence ln(1 − θg) < 0 and ln(1 − θf) < 0.
49distance, and negatively associated with their interaction, when those measures represent barriers
to the diﬀusion of productivity-enhancing innovations.
Model 2
Ad i ﬀerent mechanism that delivers analogous results is based on the assumption that geo-
graphical distance reduces the probability that the innovation is observed by the distant country,
while cultural distance increases translation costs. Suppose that country i produces an innovation
of size ∆, while country j does not. But now also assume that, when the innovation is observed in
country j, translating it into the local productive system entails a cost C which is higher for higher
cultural distance M.T h a ti s , dC
dM > 0.
The innovation will be adopted in country j i fa n do n l yi fC(M) < ∆.D e ﬁne as Φ{C(M)−∆ ≥
0} the probability that the translation costs are too high, and the innovation is not adopted in
country j.S i n c e
dC
dM




Again, the two countries’ expected diﬀerences in incomes per capita will be a function of the
probability that country j does not adopt country i’s innovation. Then the probability that the two
countries have diﬀerent income per capita is given by the sum of a) the probability that geographical
distance prevents country j from observing country i’s innovation, and b) the probability that
country j observes country i’s innovation but fails to adopt it because the translation costs due to
cultural distance are too high:
P(M,N)=[ 1− (1 − θg)N]+( 1− θg)NΦ{C(M) − ∆ ≥ 0}




= −[1 − Φ{C(M) − ∆ ≥ 0}]ln(1− θg)(1 − θg)N > 0
∂P(N,M)
∂M





=l n ( 1− θg)(1 − θg)N ∂Φ
∂M
< 0

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4 - Robustness Tests and Extensions, Part II 
(common-country fixed effects, dependent variable: difference in log income per capita in 1995) 
 

















Fst Genetic Distance  2.028 1.391 0.810 2.738  2.692 2.032
 (0.106)** (0.106)** (0.109)** (0.129)**  (0.129)** (0.111)**
Absolute difference in   0.248 0.134 -0.149 0.332  0.330 0.379
Latitudes (0.047)** (0.047)** (0.054)** (0.062)**  (0.062)** (0.047)**
Absolute difference in   -0.078 -0.127 -0.008 -0.148  -0.156 -0.040
Longitudes (0.027)** (0.027)** (0.027) (0.046)**  (0.046)** (0.025)
Geodesic Distance   0.010 -0.007 0.004 0.007  0.007 0.002
(1000s of km)  (0.003)** (0.004)* (0.004) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.003)
=1 if either country is   0.212  
an island  (0.042)**  
=1 if either country is   0.406  
landlocked (0.046)**  
Same Continent   -0.412  
Dummy (0.022)**  
Both in Asia  0.304  
 (0.037)**  
Both in Africa  -0.960  
 (0.039)**  
Both in Europe  -0.775  
 (0.048)**  
Both in North America   -1.773  
 (0.131)**  
Both in Latin   -0.107  
America/Caribbean (0.044)**  
Both in Oceania  0.041  
 (0.163)  
Linguistic Distance   0.235 
Index, dominant languages  (0.077)** 
Linguistic Distance     0.469
Index, Expected    (0.094)**
Religious Difference,     1.443
based on Barrett Data    (0.163)**
# Observations  13861 13861 13861 10011  10004 12403
(# countries)  (167) (167) (167) (142)  (142) (158)
Adjusted R-squared  0.77 0.77 0.78 0.77  0.77 0.77
Effect of 1 s.d. change in bold 
regressor, % 1 s.d. income diff. 
18.46% 12.65% 7.37% 24.91% 24.50% 18.49%
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. All specifications include 
dummies equal to 1 if countries are contiguous, if countries were or are the same country, if they share a 
common language (9% threshold), for pairs ever in a colonial relationship, for pairs with a common colonizer 
post 1945 and for pairs currently in a colonial relationship, as in column (8) of Table 2. The estimated 
coefficients for these controls (not reported) are available upon request.  
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